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Global Power Transition and the Future of
the European Union
Will EU Leaders Stop Missing Key Opportunities?
Birol Yeşilada, Portland State University & Osman Göktuğ Tanrıkulu,
Portland State University

ABSTRACT
Paper presented at the 2015 Conference of the European Union Studies Association in
Boston, March 5-8. This paper applies power transition theory to EU’s future as a global
power. It assesses economic and political/strategic capabilities of the EU vis-à-vis other
global contenders as Transatlantic Alliance is challenged by rising powers in the east China and India. Analysis includes simulations of how structural reforms (i.e fiscal
union) and membership enlargement(s) are likely to affect EU’s ability to achieve its goal
of becoming a global actor.

Yeşilada and Tanrıkulu

Introduction

2

The future of the European Union (EU) rests on a delicate balance of policy challenges.
On the one hand, recent financial crisis exposed EU’s failure to match economic and
monetary union (EMU) with necessary integration along political union. Once more, it
became crystal clear that monetary union cannot be sustained without a serious political
union. An additional problem facing the EU on this front is unwillingness of Britain to
fully commit itself to a true fiscal/political union. On another policy front, EU’s security
policies remain hostage of its worsening relations with Turkey. As EU pushed Turkey
away from potential membership, this country’s Islamist oriented government reoriented
its policies toward the Middle East and China while holding EU-NATO partnership in
limbo. Result has been damaging for full implementation of Transatlantic security
agenda with no resolution in sight. Yet, another failure concerns EU-Russia relations.
For reasons discussed later, if Russia decides to lean more toward the East and withdraw
from reliance on its current European trade partners, the prospects for a long peace may
vanish as well on EU’s eastern borders. There are no simple solutions out of these
challenges unless EU leaders can reach a consensus on a serious fiscal union (political
union) and repair relations with Russia and Turkey.
The magnitude of the financial crisis is so grave that observers and analysts 1 have
concluded a big decision must be made regarding fiscal union (thus political union) to
save EMU. Failure to formulate a viable fiscal union could derail Monetary Union and
possible breakup the Eurozone. Not only does this problem threatens deepening of
economic and monetary integration, it spills over to EU’s Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP), part of its overall Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and
makes it difficult to complete EU-NATO partnership and enable Europe to meet
challenges posed by rising powers like China and India.

The Magnitude of Challenges Facing the EU
The European Union provides the most interesting argument in favor of integration. The
expectation is that members of such a community will grow faster and become more
competitive largely due to economies of scale. In today’s competitive economy, societies
that do not take advantage of all the opportunities are likely to fall behind and be unable
to maintain continuous growth in the face of competitors with much larger markets and
investment potential. The second argument is that integration reduces the likelihood of
conflict among agents because they provide a modicum of consistent rules, make each
component dependent on the others and presumably increase the level of trust among
participants. Yet financial crisis, problems pertaining to future enlargement, and
relations with Britain, Russia and Turkey also affect EU’s ability to formulate a viable
CSDP.

The Fiscal Union & the UK Challenge
Whereas the EU represents the most successful and complex form of regional economic
and political integration between sovereign member states, it is faced with the most severe
financial crisis of its history. Moreover, the EU’s bold leap forward into EMU failed to
make it the leader of global economy. Problems facing the EU are product of its unique
1
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approach to regional economic integration that span sixty years of intergovernmental and
supranational mix of policy making. Throughout its history, the EU has followed a
continuing, though irregular, course of integration. It has been on a course that has
always found a middle way between integration that is strictly economic in nature and
integration that is strongly political, and it has, with each integrative step, brought
institutional changes representing compromises between the principles of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The outcome of their collective efforts was the
completion of the Common Market (Single Market) in 1992 that met the original intent
of the Treaty of Rome. However, complex internal and external challenges that EU
member states faced convinced them to take the next logical step in economic integration
– Economic and Monetary Union. However, European leaders did not make a similar
bold move in establishing a true political union. This shortcoming became the Achilles
heal of EMU as seen in recent financial crisis and the inability of the EU to get itself out
of the ensuing mess. As Kugler, Fisunoglu, and Yesilada notes (2015:17) “reluctance and,
in some cases, opposition among some members to deepening political union resulted in a
lopsided regional integration characterized by: (1) EMU among 17 member states, (2)
Economic Union between all members, and (3) intergovernmentalist political union.”
Debate over the need of a fiscal, thus deeper political union remained. There are two
schools of thought characterized the nature of the debate in the EU. According to one
school monetary union could not survive in the long run unless a strong political union
accompanied it and cited numerous historical cases to support its position. Going as far
back to work of William Riker (1964) in his powerful analysis of the rise of a federated
United States argued that confederations couldn’t succeed unless there are continuous
positive gains for the members. Indeed, he showed that the United States confederation
collapsed when taxes were to be imposed on the US population. In a similar manner, this
is the type of crisis that the EU faces today.
1. Are EU members willing to support others?
2. What are the limits of national as opposed to European actions?
3. What are the consequences of the weakening or disintegration of the EU?

The other school of thought maintains that the present degree of political union in the
EU is sufficient for the long run survival of the monetary union and that there is no
urgency of creating a federal structure in the Union similar to one found in the US. As
De Grauwe (2009) correctly states, debate between these two views about the link between
political and monetary union is somewhat difficult by a lack of clarity about the meaning
of political union. One can look at a monetary union as a union between countries that
use the same currency and have a single monetary authority. However, a political union is
much more difficult to define because it involves several key policy issue areas and
institutions of governance that could cover foreign and security policies, taxation,
judiciary and similar policy areas.
Political union affects monetary union in several ways. First, it makes it possible to
centralize a large part of national budgets at the supranational level and enables
significant fiscal transfers between states as insurance against asymmetric shocks. Second,
it reduces the risk of asymmetric shocks that are political in nature. When member states
are independent in pursuing their respective fiscal policies, unilateral decision of any
member to increase or lower taxes creates an asymmetric shock. A simple Stability and
growth Pact that followed EMU was simply insufficient to correct these imbalances as
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apparent from the current crisis. The magnitude of the problem is reflected in another
asymmetry that is found in the degree of integration between two camps of EU member
states – thus creating a two-track EU. Moreover, failure to deepen political integration
carries with it the danger of weakening collaboration on the CFSP/CSDP front. Kugler
et al demonstrated that how two-track EU emerged based on Genna’s (2003) Integration
Achievement Score. Figure 1 provides a summary of what we mean by two-track EU. The
two lines show different levels of integration between the two sets of member states –
those who are in EMU and others that are outside the Euro zone.
Figure 1: Integration in the EU

Source: Kugler, Fisunoglu, Yesilada, 2015: 49.

Among the non-Eurozone EU countries, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark
prefer nothing more than what one might call a loose confederal system of governance for
political union. The UK’s opposition to further deepening of economic and monetary
integration is exemplified by its resistance to fuller fiscal union and by its decision not to
join the banking union. On the other hand, a larger number of member states are willing
to join the Eurozone as full participants. The recent addition of Eastern European
nations following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 added Poland, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania to the Union. These nations in general are on a
waiting list to join the Euro area. With such diverse commitment of members to future of
full economic and monetary integration it is debatable if the EU could meet its ambition
to be a global actor.
It is fair to say that Britain has always been a dissatisfied partner in the Union, but it
has never been as close as it is now to relinquishing its membership. Due to the
devastating Euro Crisis, the European member states came to a state where further
integration is the only suitable option to prevent any future crisis and save the European
Union. For this reason, recently, members under Germany’s leadership have taken
concrete steps towards some degree of fiscal union that is short of full fiscal union with a
Treasury and EU level income tax. However, for a country, which has not even become a
member of the Monetary Union, due to issues of national sovereignty and lack of
European ideals, joining the fiscal union would be almost impossible. As a result,
Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron announced the referendum option for British
citizens, which stated that they would be able to make the decision whether to stay or
leave the European Union. This move clearly annoyed other EU member states that want
Britain to make a decision, and refrain from using departing from the EU as a
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bargaining tool. Under increasing pressure from other big powers in the EU to “play ball”
it is conceivable that UK might chose to leave the EU. Most Britons favor UK leaving
the EU according to a survey by Daily Mail (October 20, 2012). The British politicians
are divided over the matter and the Economist outlined the benefits and costs of such a
move (December 8, 2012). It should be noted, however, that UK’s potential departure
would not only affect Britain’s economic and political relations with the EU but would
also affect the Union’s aspirations to be a global actor as it competes with other giants on
the world scene – namely China, India, and the United States (Yesilada et al. 2006).
However, no one knows exactly what the benefits and challenges would be for Britain and
the EU if Britain leaves the EU, or if it stays. We will address this in the Analysis
Section of the paper.

Problems with CSDP
The EU’s CSDP is important for regional integration demonstrating that the Union is not
a mere economic enterprise and aims to place Europe as a global power in every respect of
that term. As Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp explain:
The provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP), can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty.
Furthermore, the challenges the Union faces within the international system are
ever growing and requiring an ever-increasing scope of action across different
policy fields, geographical regions and arenas of policy-making. This makes the
policy field a very relevant, although sometimes diffusing research area as three
types of foreign interactions intertwine: traditional national foreign policy, the
foreign policy of the EU as prescribed in the treaty articles on CFSP and CSDP,
and the EC external relations, which concentrate on long-standing and mostly
economic foreign relations and development policy.
(Wessels and Bopp 2008:1)
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss CDSP’s evolution but it should suffice to say
that as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP became embedded in a whole range of
other EU policies that have implications for external action by member states. The
Lisbon Treaty elevated the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to a Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP, while still being within CFSP) and made it clear
that this change indicates a greater willingness by member states to develop a military
arm of the EU – yet without a greater push for a more a supranational approach. The
reference to partnership with NATO as the foundation of member states’ security policy
(for those who are members of NATO) is proof of an intergovernmentalist approach to the
CSDP. This is apparent in upholding of Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union
by the Lisbon Treaty (ToL, Art. 28A, par. 2) reasserting “progressive framing of a
common Union defense policy will lead to a common defense, when the European
Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” It is clear from recent developments that the
CFSP needs NATO for territorial defense of the EU. In most, if not all, of its overseas
operations the EU relied on the assistance of NATO in one way or another. Thus, the
phrase “separable, but not separate” describes the current partnership between the CSDP
and NATO. Since the enlargement of NATO and the European Union in 2004 and the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007, the organizations
have 21 member countries in common (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Transatlantic and Other Affiliated Countries Overlapping Defense
Commitments

Source: IISS, European Military Capabilities, p.3.

It is not surprising that the current partnership framework heavily relies on NATO
capabilities, more precisely on the US’s heavy lift aircraft and advanced spy satellites, in
advancing the CSDP of the Union. The reliance of the CFSP on the U.S. becomes more
clear when one considers the future defense expenditures of these Allies. According to a
report by the Financial Times (November 17, 2010:9), the EU suffers not only from
declining defense expenditures but also from heavy over duplication of its members’
defense infrastructure. Figure 3 shows defense expenditures for the EU and US during
2001-2009.
Figure 3. EU-US Defense Expenditures ($million in 2010 prices)
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Source: SIPRI (http://www.sipri.org/databases/).

The observed trend is likely to get worse when one considers planned defense budget cuts
among NATO’s leading EU members for reasons related to fiscal austerity following the
financial crisis. Since 2008, NATO members have been reducing their defense budgets

6
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while Russia has been steadily increasing its defense spending (Jonathan Beale, BBC,
February 25, 2015).
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Table 1: Military Expenditures

Contrast this with Russia's defense spending, which is rising from 3.4% of its GDP this
year to 4.2% in 2016 ($81bn or £52.2bn). Russia is also stepping up its military activities
and is actively seeking to draw Turkey away from NATO by signing a lucrative gas
agreement with that country’s government. At the same time, Russia signaled that it is a
potential source of credit to Greece if this country’s government does not secure a
favorable deal from Eurozone finance ministers. One additional example of how Russia
is actively undermining EU’s CSDP is the new agreement it signed with Cyprus that
grants Russian navy access to Cypriot ports (BBC February 25, 2015). The Cyprus
government also acknowledged that the two countries were discussing the possibility of
Russia using an air base on Cyprus for humanitarian relief missions. All this happening
as Cyprus maintains that it wants to be a full participant in EU-NATO partnership and
desires to join NATO!
As if these developments did not create enough challenges for EU’s CSDP, members
continue to duplicate their defense industries to such an extent that collective efficiency is
nonexistent. A strong intergovernmental approach to the CFSP and CSDP assures that
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each member state continues to maintain national defense industries rather than
determine which country should specialize in manufacturing of which weapons systems.
This further complicates integrated defense systems and fails to achieve economies of
scale. Currently the EU has 21 naval shipyards compared to 3 in the US, 89 different
European weapons programs as opposed to 27 American systems, and Europe has 11
different tank productions while the US has two. Moreover, technological advantage of
American defense industries continues to put the US ahead of her European allies.
Moreover, the new members of the EU that also joined NATO (former Communist states)
continue to present a costly modernization program for these countries’ militaries.
Without a fully integrated EU-NATO partnership, and a deeper political union among
EU member states, the European side of the Alliance will continue to feel the pressure of
falling behind the US and will remain a junior partner. The bottom line is that until EU
members formulate an integrated and optimized defense industries, their expenditures in
this area will continue to be inefficient and present an obstacle in developing costly
systems, i.e., heavy lift capability aircraft, which would reduce Europe’s dependence on
the Americans.

Problems with Turkey and the Russian Challenge
Turkey
It can be argued that the EU could significantly bolster its defense capabilities if Turkey
were to become a member of the Union. Findings by scholars (Grant 2005, Hughes 2004,
Independent Commission 2009, Onis 2008, Tocci 2007, and Yesilada 2012) show that for
the EU, having Turkey as a member would make significant contributions to Union’s
CFSP and energy security, and contribute to regional stability. It will also go a long way
in showcasing to the rest of the world that EU is not a Christian club. These are
monumental opportunities that should not be overlooked by officials in Brussels and EU
capitols. Yet, shortsighted policies of some of the member states’ governments threaten
realization of this historic opportunity.
However, given all the current problems surrounding this topic, how could Transatlantic
Allies find a compromise position? In other words, would it be possible or acceptable to
bring Turkey into the CSDP prior to full membership in the EU? It is in this area that
Turkey, representing a crucial link in the EU-NATO partnership and one which is an
important factor in the future development of the Union’s CSDP, can turn the table on
those member states opposing its accession. Until recently, Turkish governments carefully
balanced their foreign and security policies between their European and NATO Allies
(primarily the US). Today, however, this is hardly the case. Since the failed Annan Plan
(2004) to reunite Cyprus followed by accession of only the Greek part of that country to
the Union and the subsequent election of anti-Turkey governments in France and
Germany, relations between EU-Turkey took a turn to the worse.
The alternative scenario of closing the door on Turkey is far more dangerous and
unpredictable. It could result in numerous outcomes including one where Turkey stop
viewing the EU as a friend and partner, turns its back on Europe and looks to the East
and/or South. There are several scenarios hypothesized by observers of EU-Turkey
relations that include one where Turks could also look at Russia, and possibly China, as
future strategic partners. As Cengiz Aktar noted (Bilefkey 2009) “the West should fear a
wounded Turkey turning to Russia. Already, Russia has been courting it as a distribution
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point for energy supplies, while Turkish investment in Russia is intensifying. . .This
government is perfectly capable of saying ‘no thanks’ to Europe and instead shifting
toward Russia.” Recent decision by the Turkish government to purchase Chinese antimissile system that cannot be integrated in to NATO’s defense infrastructure further
underscores how far the Erdogan government is willing to push the envelope in
reorienting Turkey’s defense strategies. As for AKP’s natural preferences for foreign
relations, the global financial crisis had contracted European economies, prompting
Turkey, a large exporter, to seek different markets and that leaders of AKP felt more at
home in Riyadh, Damascus and Baghdad than in Paris, London or Rome. Indeed, this
has been the focus of AKP’s foreign policy during the last several years and has caused
serious damage to Turkey’s relations with Israel while raising concerns in Washington.

9

The immediate impact of post-Annan Plan developments can also be seen in the level of
trust affected people held towards the EU (see Figure 4). The figure shows steady and
then sharp decline in EU support among these peoples. It is interesting to note that
among the Cypriots it is the Greeks who display least favorable view towards the EU. One
wonders what this picture would look like today in light of financial bailout terms the
EU wants to impose on Greek Cypriot bank depositors. Turkish Cypriots, on the other
hand, are more favorable towards the EU, which could be explained as a sign of
desperation. Everyday life in north Cyprus is plagued with crime, worsening public
services, corruption, and overt Islamization activities imposed upon the Turkish Cypriots
by the AKP government in Turkey. Although unhappy with how they were treated by the
EU after the Annan Plan, broken promises and all, the Turkish Cypriots see their
emancipation only through the EU.
Figure 4: Support for EU Among Cypriots and Turks

Source: Figures obtained from Eurobarometer surveys.

This figure also supports the argument that since 2004 public opinion towards the EU has
been on a decline among Turks. Recently, Birol Yesilada (2012) showed a direct
relationship between decline in public opinion support for EU in Turkey and Turks’
perception of anti-Turkey EU policies and mistreatment of Turkish Cypriots. To make

Yeşilada and Tanrıkulu

matters worse, the AKP government seems less than enthusiastic to continue with
Copenhagen reforms and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has fueled anti-European
public sentiment by equally damaging outbursts. As far as the Turks are concerned, the
blame is on the Europeans.

10

Russia
When it comes to EU’s security policies (economic and political), one can argue that
Russia is the elephant in the room. While EU-US and Russia disagreements began to
emerge as NATO expanded into former Soviet areas, the two sides still continued to
cooperate on nuclear agreements and proceeded to discuss a cooperation agreement under
President Clinton and President Yeltsin. However, this agreement did not materialize
before the first expansion of NATO. About this time, a great opportunity to anchor Russia
as a link between West and China was lost and subsequent rise to power of Putin in
Russia further added to growing dissatisfaction of this country with NATO’s strategic
ambitions.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent bloodshed in eastern Ukraine is the
first major conflict at the border of East and West since World War II. In response to the
illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s aggressive military intervention in eastern
Ukraine, the West has imposed heavy economic sanctions on Russia. These developments
represent the deepest plunge in U.S.-EU-Russian relations since the Cold War. Western
leaders had hoped economic measures would suffice to pressure Kremlin to change its
political course in Ukraine. Instead, such policies simply serve to further push Russia
into closer relationship with China. Vladimir Putin continues to back separatist forces in
Ukraine and signed a 30-year gas agreement with China worth $400 billion
(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/russia-china-add-to-400-billion-gasdeal-with-accord). According to Kugler and Tuzova (2015) the emergent Sino-Russian
coalition creates a link between very large military powers that have large populations
and growing economies that might by mid-century match or surpass that of G7. Such
comprehensive security, economic, and military cooperation between Russia and China
weakens any attempts by the West to change Russia’s behavior by economic sanctions.
There is a danger that China-Russia interactions will continue to increase, particularly if
China perceives a threat from the West. The size of the joint territories, populations,
natural resources, and technology will make the alliance of the two countries a major
force in world politics.

Power Transition Analysis of EU’s Future
Power Transition theory provides a useful perspective to analyze how the EU would fair
in its global competition with other great powers. The theory is based on A. F. K.
Organski’s (1958) pioneering work that describes a hierarchical global system. According
to this theory, the distribution of power in the international system is uneven. Power
Transition specifies the relative roles of nations within this hierarchy, the system of
governing rules, and then outlines how powerful countries attempt to manage global
politics. Power Transition paints a picture of world politics that is integrated
horizontally and vertically (Tammen 2000, Kugler and Tammen 2012). Additional
application of this theory is found in Lemke (2002) who made a major breakthrough
moving Power Transition toward a general theory of world politics by demonstrating the
applicability of this perspective to regional hierarchies. His careful empirical analysis
shows that the same principles that hold at the global level define interactions within

Yeşilada and Tanrıkulu

11

regional hierarchies as shown in Figure 5. Members of regional hierarchies interact with
each other. Understanding regional hierarchies adds complexity and generality to the
Power Transition perspective. Global powers like the US, EU, Russia and soon China can
directly intervene to alter outcomes in a region. They are able to interact, of course, but on
matters of strategic importance it is a one-way street. There is more reason and
opportunity for global powers to intervene in those other regions (Efird et al. 2003;
Yesilada et al. 2006). This interferes with the ability of regional powers to operate under
the normal rules. Lemke informs us that the rules within regional hierarchies normally
match those at the global level but the ability of global powers to intervene does not make
this an exact parallel (Lemke 1996, 2002; Lemke and Reed, 1996).
Dynamically, the theory stipulates that political interactions among nations are based on
the varying commitment among national elites to the existing institutional status quo.
This broad acceptance of international rules and norms determines whether a country is
satisfied or dissatisfied with its position in the hierarchy and trust that the institutions
created advances their interests. The most powerful nations hold a position at the top of
the global or regional hierarchy. The dominant nation attempts to manage the regional
system with a coalition of stable, satisfied supporters. When agreement is in place, the
dominant nation can ease the process of integration. When disagreements emerge among
large nations who do not trust the institutions created, integration comes to a standstill or
recedes. Power Transitions perspective tells us that currently, the United States is the
dominant power in the international power hierarchy. According to the same perspective,
at present, the great powers are China, the EU, India, and Russia are also regional powers
in their respective geographic regions.
Figure 5: Global and regional hierarchies

Source: Kugler, Yeşilada, & Fisunoğlu, “Consequences of Reversing the EU Integration” (2015:7)

According to Power Transition theory, power defines the conditions of war and peace in
the international system. Power is defined as the ability to make opponents comply with
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demands. Power is composed of three elements: population, economic productivity (GDP)
and the ability of the political system in extracting resources from society. Population is
an essential component of the power equation; however, in order to be relatively powerful,
population must be more productive than the rivals. High political capacity is the other
requirement to be powerful or developed. Politically capable governments can relatively
extract more resources and utilize them for national goals (Kugler and Tammen 2012).

In addition to power and status quo dynamics, power transition theory includes the
concept of hierarchal relationships among global and regional powers. An unordered
hierarchy is one where most nations hold roughly equal shares of power. This situation
presents the most likely conditions for conflict and the least likely conditions for
integration. The reason is that nations in uniform hierarchies face few power constraints
and are only restrained by the degree of satisfaction with the status quo. In the absence of
a regionally dominant country supporting the status quo, competition among two or more
contenders is the rule to resolve disputes among parties that vie for control of the region.
Thus, conflict is more likely to occur within a uniform hierarchy as each contender with
different interests and incentives attempts to impose its influence upon the region. In
uniform hierarchies, the larger powers focus on protecting themselves from emerging
challengers. In this context even when nations are satisfied with each other, cooperation
is less likely.
Asymmetric hierarchies are characterized by power concentrated in the hands of a
dominant global or regional power that establishes and supports the status quo. In
structural environments where the dominant nation is at least twenty percent stronger
than any contender, the hierarchy is deemed ordered (Organski and Kugler 1980). The
dominant nation can spend more of its resources ensuring the best support possible for the
economic and political terms established in the status quo. In an asymmetric
environment, war may still be waged, but it is less likely and will result in relatively low
casualties – as is the case in the ongoing “war against terrorism”.
Efird (2001) and Efird, and Genna (2002) and Efird et.al. (2003) extended the theory and
argued that the development of regional integration after a power transition between two
satisfied powers improves because the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest
in not only maintaining but also furthering and institutionalizing the arrangements that
it believes to have contributed to its rise. Efird and Genna’s statistical test provides strong
support for their hypothesis. Efird (2001) expanded in Efird et.al. (2003) argued that the
following relationship captures the dynamics preceding conflict and cooperation in the
international system:

(

)

CI = RP − S RP 3 + H c + H D
Where;
CI = Conflict = Integration;
RP = Relative Power;
S = Status Quo;
Hc = Hierarchy of Challenger; and
HD = Hierarchy of Defender
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Assumptions behind this model can be found in various works and are summarized in
Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk (2006). First, when relative power is at parity, the severity
of conflict is maximized because both sides anticipate an equal probability of success.
Formal work on the median voter theory indicates that this insight is consistent with
rational expectations. Indeed, as Black anticipated, when two candidates with opposing
points of view enter an election they will attempt to reach the median first-- assuring
them of victory. Contested elections are those where the outcome is unclear – i.e. the last
two Presidential elections in the US. Moreover, when parity is approached and policy
differences are fundamental, tempers flare and electoral conflicts escalate to direct
confrontations. The same process takes place in world politics. When nations are
satisfied with international norms (S>0) the cubed RP term shifts the highest propensity
for conflict past the parity point. Thus, greater asymmetry improves the likelihood of
cooperation assuming that the dyad is at least somewhat jointly satisfied, especially when
dyads are highly asymmetric. Further, Organski and Kugler (1980:59) found that the
dissatisfied challenger initiates conflict in the post-transition period pointing to a cubed
RP term. Such results proved again to be consistent with later formal proofs. Kugler and
Zagare (1986), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Alsharabati (1997) show game
theoretically that the defender does not preempt at preponderance because it values the
status quo and prefers to postpone action. On the other hand, the dissatisfied challenger is
willing to wage war since the highest likelihood of success is anticipated after the
transition point.
Operationalization of this model’s variables is based on estimation of following indicators
(Tanrikulu 2013). Relative power is the capacity of one nation to influence another
either by persuasion or by force. The more relatively powerful a nation is, the more
capable it is to impose its preferences on the others in its hierarchy. In this model GDP at
purchasing power parity (with 2005 US Dollars) will be used to measure power. Since it is
intended to run a simulation with the model until 2050, GDP data is taken from
International Futures version 6.69. In trying to determine how influential the UK can be
against German leadership, relative power is going to be taken as follows:
RP=
The closer the level of GDP of the challenger to the dominant power, the less orderliness
there is in that hierarchy. Therefore, the higher the level of UK’s GDP relative to
Germany’s, the lower the level of orderliness will be in the European hierarchy. This
situation is captured by the formula because an increase in RP will be reflected as an
increase in the conflict-integration score, meaning a higher probability of conflict. When
Germany’s GDP level increases more than the UK’s GDP, RP will start to get smaller and
decrease the probability of conflict on the conflict- integration continuum.
The satisfaction variable represented with ‘S’ in the formula defines whether the RP will
create conflict or not. As it is mentioned before, two Eurobarometer questions related to
‘trust’ and ‘membership’ are going to be used to account for the level of satisfaction with
the status quo. The survey question data related to ‘trust’ and ‘membership’ are in
percentages. To be able to use these data in the conflict- integration formula, it is rescaled
between -1 to 1. As a result, percentages between 50 to 0 are rescaled between 0 to -1, and
percentages between 50 to 100 are rescaled between 0 to -1. When the level of satisfaction
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is below 50%, it is going to be transformed into a negative number representing
dissatisfaction between 0 and -1, and due to the negative sign before the ‘S’ variable in the
formula, the dissatisfaction level will cause an increase on the continuum representing an
increase in the level of conflict. If the level of satisfaction is higher than 50%, rescaling
the number will transform it into a positive number between 0 to 1, and due to the
negative sign before the ‘S’ variable in the formula, the model will perceive it as an
increasing level of cooperation/ integration.
The data of the question related to ‘trust’ is adjusted to be able to use in the conflictintegration model. It should be noted that data of the question related to trust between
1999 and 1993 is missing. This missing period is interpolated to be able to use in the
formula. Furthermore, data on the first question ‘trust’ does not go back to 1973 like the
data of the second question regarding ‘membership’. Therefore, the ‘trust’ data is
extrapolated from 1993 to 1973, which is the date when the UK became a member of the
Union.

The trust variable captures the level of satisfaction with the status quo better than the
alliance portfolios. In classic Power Transitions analysis, the similarity of alliance
portfolios have been used to measure the level of satisfaction with the status quo. The
similarity of alliance portfolios is calculated via dyadic relationships. It is inferred that
“dyads with similar portfolios are satisfied with each other’s view of the international
system or dyadic relationship, and those with dissimilar portfolios are regarded as less
satisfied with each other” (Efird, Kugler, & Genna, 2003, p. 297). However, this
measurement comes with two fundamental problems in terms of what this paper assesses.
First, similarity of alliance portfolios does not directly account for the status quo. Second,
dyadic relationship does not capture the behavior or interaction of multiple countries.
Encapsulating multiple countries functioning is significant especially when there is a
certain level of integration between multiple countries. When countries go into
integration, the rules and guidelines of the integration become the status quo. In this
situation, to be able to account satisfaction, one should directly focus on integration
instead of dyadic alliance similarities. Therefore, directly representing the European
integration, trust and membership variables capture the level of satisfaction with the
status quo.
The cubed RP term in the formula captures the propensity for conflict in Power
Transitions. If the RP term in the interactive part of the equation were linear, each unit
increase of RP would cause equal increases on the conflict- integration continuum. If RP
were squared, it would not reflect the likelihood of conflict at parity points. Since
RP=PowerChallenger/PowerDominant, the formula should reflect the probability of conflict
once the relative power of the challenger increases in terms of the dominant power. It is
anticipated that the likelihood of conflict peaks when the challenger and the dominant
power are in parity. For this reason, squaring RP would underemphasize the amount of
conflict. However, cubing RP gives the highest propensity for conflict right after the
challenger passes the parity point with the defender. Additionally, the cubed RP also
reflects the higher probability of cooperation when the asymmetry between the dominant
power and the challenger increases (Efird et al., 2003).
HD and HC reflect the relative power of the dominant power in terms of all the contenders
in the region. The calculations of these variables are as follows:
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HD =

HC =
When the power of the dominant country decreases compared to the contenders in the
hierarchy, the total of HC and HD increases to reflect the increasing propensity for
conflict. When the powers of the contenders increase compared to the dominant power,
HC’s increase will be more than HD’s decrease to reflect higher propensity for conflict.
The model will first take the regional contenders as UK, France, Italy, Spain and Poland.

Analysis
Given the growing power of China in world affairs and its implications for global power
transition (Kugler and Tammen 2005, Tammen at. all. 2005), we looked at how different
scenarios of EU integration/disintegration would affect global power transition and its
impact on EU’s competitiveness in the international system. Figure 6 compares how a
fully integrated EU fairs in global competition with other great powers. Results, which
are updates of previous calculations (Kugler, Yesilada, Fisunoglu 2015), are sobering.
Both Western powers (EU and US) will be overtaken by China and India as the dominant
economies in the world. By the end of the 21st century the EU and its likely ally the US
are expected to have half the economic power of China and India, and one-third the size
of their respective populations.
Figure 6: The timeline of USA, EU, China, and India, 1960-2100.

China or India alone will have the overall capabilities of the United States and the
current EU. These Asian giants will no doubt dominate global affairs in the next century.
For this reason an expansion of the EU and the recreation of an Atlantic alliance are
central if the western nations are to play a principal role in the next Century.
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Figure 7 shows the regional consequences of a more integrated Eurozone led by Germany
that excludes large free riders like the UK, compared with the European Union and an
enlarged European Union that includes Turkey. The United States is added to provide a
size comparison This four dimensional graph presents total output to assess the size of the
society in y-axis and population to assess the future potential of the society in x-axis. The
size of the bubble is the GDP per capita to approximate the productivity of the
population. Lastly, the time dimension is embedded through the ﬂow of bubbles. The
initial bubbles, which start near the origin, stand for the year 1960, and the outermost
bubbles, where the labels are attached, stand for the year 2100. Each bubble in-between
represents a year from 1960 to 2100. Bubbles linked by lines indicate EU expansions.
Figure 7: USA, European Union (with or without Turkey), and Eurozone, 1960–2100

Results indicate that a smaller Eurozone could become more of a federation but at the
expense of reducing much of the population and power capability of the current European Union. While not inconsequential, this unit would represent about half of the power
of the United States and less than half its population. The current European Union
would be closer to 75% of the United States. This situation points out a classic Catch-22. A
smaller Euro group would be cohesive, but would have far less capacity to incorporate
other large members and would be less powerful at the global level. A more
intergovernmental European Union that reverts back to a Single Market could attract
more new potential large members. Yet, with reduced trust, it would be less powerful at
the global level for lack of cohesiveness.
We next looked at the consequences of reversing EU integration with two scenarios – one
with Britain leaving and another where Germany leaves the Union. Figures 8 and 9
provide results for these simulations. In the case of German withdrawal from the
Eurozone, this country will become a minor player on the world scene (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: The timeline of Germany, USA, China, and India, 1960-2100.

As for the UK, the results are very similar to those of Germany. If Britain withdraws
from the EU, it will be a minor player on the world stage (Figure 9). Results clearly
indicate that the UK would lose its economic and political power in the global system if it
departs from the EU. As a single country, it is not possible for the UK to keep up with the
rising Asian powers: China and India. The deeper the level of integration with the EU,
the higher the UK’s level of influence will be in the international system.
Figure 9: Forecasting UK’s departure from the EU, 1960 – 2100
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For the EU, the benefit of having a powerful member is smaller than the costs it brings.
If Britain leaves the EU, this would be a serious loss in terms of its level of capability.
However, the debt crisis showed that commitment to the integration is more important
than the level of GDP to sustain the Union as a global actor. The EU has to avoid any
conflict directed to the integration process coming from the members. Otherwise, the
Union would lose its coherence and become a weaker actor in the international arena. If
Britain is going to stay in the EU, it is significant that it has the European vision for
integration. Including Britain into further level of integration without enough
commitment for the Union would jeopardize the integration process. If the UK is
included in further level of integration without enough commitment, the propensity of
conflict will be higher. To avoid further conflict, a two-tract formulation can be
formulated. Thus Britain and similar countries can take that track, which is a lower
level of integration, until they have the vision for further integration (Tanrikulu 2013).

The future of both the UK and the EU is bound to their ability to compromise and
cooperate. Realizing its own capacity and the future power transitions in the global arena
should make the UK appreciate its EU membership. On the other hand, the EU should
work for methods that will increase the coherence of the member states. Mechanisms that
will keep the less commitment members apart will save the speed and the development of
the integration process. The highest level of utility in the long run can only come with
higher level of cooperation.
As if these internal challenges of the EU were not enough, Russia now represents a
serious problem for Transatlantic Allies. Events in Ukraine destroyed any hope of erasing
mistrust between NATO and Russia that emerged after expansion of the Atlantic Alliance
to former Soviet republics of Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, increasing economic
sanctions are likely to cause serious problems for the Russian economy and this, in turn,
will fuel more anti-Western sentiment among the Russians. There is no doubt that
Putin’s actions have isolated his country from the developed world and he has
increasingly turned toward China for economic agreements to offset the impact of
Western sanctions. There is no realistic option available for Putin to challenge the West
on his own as shown by data in Figure 10. Prospects for the Russian economic power are
grim, as it will lose ground to other regional powers. In a serious way, Russia is
increasingly becoming dependent on China and given the fact that both of these countries’
leaders are dissatisfied with the status quo international regimes they are likely to form a
Sino-Russian coalition to challenge the Transatlantic Allies.
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Source: Jacek Kugler and Yelena Tuzova (2015).

We next applied conflict=cooperation estimation of Efird, Genna, and Kugler (2003) to
UK-EU and Transatlantic (EU+US) – China dyads to show prospects for future relations
between these countries. Figures 11 and 12 show results of these relationships.
Figure 11: Forecasting Conflict-Cooperation, EU & US-China, 2000-2050

Yeşilada and Tanrıkulu

20

Conflict

Figure 11: Forecasting the probability of conflict between the UK and the EU
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These results show that in case of Transatlantic-China relations, probability of conflict
increases in line with rising power of China that was shown and discussed above. A
dissatisfied China is likely to confront current dominant powers as parity is reached by
mid-century. In this competition, China is likely to look for additional allies, like
dissatisfied Russia, to further increase its capacity to challenge the Western alliance.
With regard to internal EU relations, the UK is currently in no position to challenge the
other countries until it reaches parity with Germany by 2030 – give or take a few years.
If UK’s dissatisfaction persists during this period, then we observe a gradual increase in
probability of conflict (gradually intensifying with each passing year) beginning around
2035. This rising propensity of conflict is a serious threat on the European integration
process and should be of concern for current EU leadership as they debate future of the
Union.

Conclusions and Prospects

This analysis shows that implications of problems facing EU integration are far more
complex than finding a quick fix to its current financial crisis. Failure to achieve a
realistic fiscal union (political union) has serious implications for EU members to fulfill
their obligations in another policy domain – namely CSDP. Recent slowdown in EU
integration not only adds to regional problems, but it also has serious consequences for the
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economic stability of the international system. Moreover, the slowdown in integration
that previously reduced tensions within the European region could reset the stage not only
for regional confrontations but also to increase the likelihood of a global conflict. Missed
opportunities with Russia and Turkey have set in motion developments that could
seriously alter the balance of power at the systemic level that could only benefit China.
Regionally and globally the EU cannot afford to move from the cooperative contest to a
confrontational one, i.e. the UK breaking away or Germany dropping out of the
Eurozone, where solutions are arrived at by force rather than reason. EU leaders need to
resolve the current crisis in the EMU, build upon it to reinvigorate the integration
process and provide a path for complete regional integration that includes a real political
union. The alternative scenarios of member states reverting back to pre-Maastricht or preSingle European Act years are simply non-starters for the future of a stable European
Union and global peace.
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